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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE NEW BATSON: OPENING THE DOOR OF THE JURY
DELIBERATION ROOM AFTER PEÑA-RODRIGUEZ V. COLORADO

JAROD S. GONZALEZ*
I. INTRODUCTION
Secrecy in jury deliberations is an important aspect of the American jury
system. In both criminal and civil jury trials, what goes on in the jury
deliberations room generally stays in the jury deliberations room. 1 It is very
difficult to impeach a jury verdict and get a new trial based on internal
deliberations—what jurors say to each other during the course of formal
deliberations. 2 There are very good reasons for the no-impeachment rule: the
need for finality in jury determinations and for jurors to have free and open
discussions among themselves about the case, to name a few. 3 Yet, a strict
application of the no-impeachment rule could be problematic. There is a valid
countervailing concern that improper juror statements or behavior during jury
deliberations could undermine the fairness of a trial when such statements
influence the verdict, perhaps implicating due process, equal protection, and
fundamental justice concerns. 4 Recognizing that the jury system as a human

* Copyright © 2017, Jarod S. Gonzalez, Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law;
B.B.A., summa cum laude, University of Oklahoma, 1997; J.D., with highest honors, University of
Oklahoma College of Law, 2000.
1. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267 (1915) (recognizing that the weight of authority in
federal and state jurisdictions is that a juror cannot impeach his own verdict because of the public
injury that would occur if jurors were allowed to testify concerning what happened in the jury
room).
2. Sellars v. United States, 401 A.2d 974, 981 (D.C. 1979) (“Courts consistently have
exercised great caution in allowing jurors to impeach their verdicts.”).
3. The rule that a juror may not impeach his own verdict once the jury has been discharged
was formulated “to foster several public policies: (1) discouraging harassment of jurors by losing
parties eager to have the verdict set aside; (2) encouraging free and open discussion among jurors;
(3) reducing incentives for jury tampering; (4) promoting verdict finality; (5) maintaining the
viability of the jury as a judicial decision-making body.” Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 523
F.2d 140, 148 (3d Cir. 1975).
4. McDonald, 238 U.S. at 269 (noting that the no-impeachment rule could recognize
exceptions in the “gravest and most important cases” where exclusion of juror testimony might
violate principles of justice); United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. 361, 366 (1852) (“[C]ases might arise
in which it would be impossible to refuse [juror testimony] without violating the plainest principles
of justice.”).
397
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institution cannot, as a practical matter, guarantee every party a perfect trial, 5
should the generally closed-door to the jury deliberations room be opened after
the trial for consideration of jury misconduct or error that occurred during the
jury deliberations?
As a result of the recent United States Supreme Court’s decision in PeñaRodriguez v. Colorado, the closed-door to the jury deliberations room has been
constitutionally cracked open to consider post-trial complaints of juror
expressions of racial bias during deliberations as a basis for a new trial. 6 In PeñaRodriguez, the Court held that:
[W]here a juror makes a clear statement that indicates he or she relied on racial
stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment
requires that the no-impeachment rule give way in order to permit the trial court
to consider the evidence of the juror’s statement and any resulting denial of the
jury trial guarantee. 7

The new Peña-Rodriguez rule constitutionalizes a racial bias exception to the
no-impeachment rule that had previously been a matter of policy choice among
the various federal and state jurisdictions. 8
Taking the law as it now stands, this Article explores various issues that are
likely to arise in all jurisdictions in the wake of the Peña-Rodriguez decision.
First, this Article examines the history of the no-impeachment rule and the
various approaches to this rule from an evidence perspective in federal and state
jurisdictions. Second, the Article explains the Peña-Rodriguez decision that
makes a constitutional exception to this rule in the context of expressions of
racial bias during jury deliberations in criminal cases and evaluates the possible
expansion of this holding to civil cases. Third, the Article explores the future
development of additional categorical exceptions to the no-impeachment rule
such as gender bias and religious bias that are protected under the Constitution
based on the Court’s reasoning in Peña-Rodriguez. Finally, the Article considers
procedures and standards for implementing the Peña-Rodriguez decision and
determining whether to grant a new trial based on expressions of racial bias
during jury deliberations. The fundamental point of this Article is that the PeñaRodriguez holding is likely to extend to civil cases, and exceptions beyond race.
Additionally, procedural rules will be developed in a manner that is consistent
with how the constitutional Batson exception to peremptory challenges has
developed over the last thirty years.

5. Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81, 87 (Mo. 2010) (en banc) (“While
every party is entitled to a fair trial, as a practical matter, our jury system cannot guarantee every
party a perfect trial.”).
6. 137 S. Ct. 855, 879 (2017) (Alito, J., dissenting).
7. Id. at 869 (majority opinion).
8. Id. at 865–66.
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II. HISTORY OF THE NO-IMPEACHMENT RULE
Every state and federal jurisdiction follows to a substantial degree the
concept that jury verdicts cannot be impeached based on what occurs during
formal jury deliberations. 9 This concept originated from the English common
law rule that jurors could not impeach their verdict through affidavit or live
testimony. 10 The original English common law “Mansfield” rule was a strict rule
that prohibited jurors from testifying about their subjective mental processes or
events that occurred during deliberations. 11 American jurisdictions have tended
to follow the Mansfield rule in general but with three slightly different
approaches. First, Texas applies the “outside influence” rule. 12 This approach
generally protects all juror statements and events during deliberations from
impeachment of the verdict but permits new trials based on outside influences—
like the threatening of jurors—that affect the integrity of the jury’s decisionmaking process. 13 In general, an outside influence has to come from a source
outside the formal deliberation process such as a nonjuror third party. 14 Second,
the federal rules approach permits exceptions to the no-impeachment rule for

9. Id. at 865 (“Some version of the no-impeachment rule is followed in every State and the
District of Columbia.”).
10. Vaise v. Delaval, 1 T.R. 11, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785).
11. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 863 (“The Mansfield rule, as it came to be known,
prohibited jurors, after the verdict was entered, from testifying either about their subjective mental
processes or about objective events that occurred during deliberations.”).
12. TEX. R. CIV. P. 327(b) (“A juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring
during the course of the jury’s deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror’s
mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict concerning his mental
processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify whether any outside influence
was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement
by him concerning a matter about which he would be precluded from testifying be received for
these purposes.”); TEX. R. EVID. 606(b) (“(1) Prohibited Testimony or Other Evidence. During an
inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify about any statement made
or incident that occurred during the jury’s deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s or
another juror’s vote; or any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict or indictment. The court
may not receive a juror’s affidavit or evidence of a juror’s statement on these matters. (2)
Exceptions. A juror may testify: about whether an outside influence was improperly brought to bear
on any juror; or to rebut a claim that the juror was not qualified to serve.”).
13. Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 24 S.W.3d 362, 370, 373–74 (Tex. 2000)
(recognizing that comments made by one juror to another juror during deliberations are not outside
influences); Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mendez, 155 S.W.3d 382, 413 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004),
rev’d on other grounds, 204 S.W.3d 797 (Tex. 2006) (recognizing that a juror looking up the
definition of the term “negligence” in a dictionary and communicating the definition with fellow
jurors during jury deliberations is not an outside influence).
14. See Editorial Caballero v. Playboy Enter., 359 S.W.3d 318, 324 (Tex. Ct. App. 2012), cert.
denied, No. 12-0194 2012 Tex. LEXIS 948 (2012). But see McQuarrie v. State, 380 S.W.3d 145,
151, 154 (Tex. Crim App. 2012) (noting that information does not have to originate from a nonjuror to be considered an outside influence).
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testimony about events extraneous to the deliberative process. 15 This includes
outside influences such as juror bribing but also broadens out to include possible
“extraneous prejudicial information” such as unauthorized juror views of crime
scenes, juror experiments on the evidence, juror consultation, and juror
consideration of dictionaries and newspapers. 16 Under this approach, extraneous
prejudicial information could presumably originate from the jurors themselves
without any connection to a third party. Third, some jurisdictions follow the socalled “Iowa” rule that prevents jurors from testifying about their own subjective
beliefs, thoughts, or motives during deliberations but allows jurors to testify
about objective facts and events that occurred during deliberations based on the
idea that jurors could corroborate that testimony. 17 Of these three different
approaches, the Texas outside influences rule appears to remain closest to the
original common law Mansfield rule. 18 The federal rules approach also stays
close to the Mansfield rule. 19 Both of these approaches encourage full and frank
discussions among jurors during deliberations and try to ensure that jurors will
not have to provide testimony about their verdict or otherwise be bothered by
litigants seeking to challenge the verdict. The Iowa rule is the most flexible
approach and errs on the side of protecting litigants from jury misconduct during
deliberations. 20 Within these various approaches, prior to Peña-Rodriguez, at
least sixteen jurisdictions recognized an exception to the no-impeachment rule

15. FED. R. EVID. 606(b) (“(1) Prohibited Testimony or Other Evidence. During an inquiry
into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify about any statement made or
incident that occurred during the jury’s deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s or
another juror’s vote; or any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict or indictment. The court
may not receive a juror’s affidavit or evidence of a juror’s statement on these matters. (2)
Exceptions. A juror may testify about whether: (A) extraneous prejudicial information was
improperly brought to the jury’s attention; (B) an outside influence was improperly brought to bear
on any juror; (C) or a mistake was made in entering the verdict on the verdict form.”).
16. See Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 863 (recognizing that the federal approach to the noimpeachment rule allowed juror “testimony about events extraneous to the deliberative process
such as reliance on outside evidence” like newspapers and dictionaries or personal investigation of
the facts); United States v. Duncan, 598 F.2d 839, 866 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 871
(1979) (recognizing a jury’s unauthorized use of a dictionary is misconduct but not prejudicial per
se); United States v. Williams-Davis, 821 F. Supp. 727, 740 (D.D.C. 1993) (recognizing a juror’s
unauthorized visit to a crime scene is extraneous information under Federal Rule of Evidence
606(b)); In re Beverly Hills Fire Litigation, 695 F.2d 207, 213 (6th Cir. 1982) (recognizing that
juror experiment is extraneous information under Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b)).
17. Wright v. Ill. & Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195, 212 (Iowa 1866).
18. McQuarrie, 380 S.W.3d at 163–64.
19. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 863 (noting that the federal approach stayed closer to the
original Mansfield rule than the Iowa rule).
20. Id. (characterizing the Iowa rule as a flexible version of the no-impeachment rule).
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for post-verdict juror testimony that racial bias was a factor in jury
deliberations. 21
III. THE NEW BATSON: EXTENDING PEÑA-RODRIGUEZ TO CIVIL CASES IN
FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS
A.

The Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado Decision

Prior to Peña-Rodriguez, each jurisdiction considered whether to make an
exception to the no-impeachment rule for juror testimony about a juror’s alleged
racial bias expressed during deliberations. The Peña-Rodriguez Court held that
where a juror clearly states or indicates that he or she relied on racial stereotypes
or animus to convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment jury trial
guarantee requires that a trial court consider the juror’s statement and any
resulting denial of such guarantee to the criminal defendant. 22 After PeñaRodriguez, federal criminal defendants and state criminal defendants are now
entitled to impeach a jury’s verdict with juror testimony about a juror’s alleged
racial bias. 23 The exception applies to state criminal defendants because the
Fourteenth Amendment makes the Sixth Amendment applicable to the states. 24
While perhaps atypical, history is replete with instances where jurors have
deliberated and then returned a verdict based on silly, improper, mischievous,
and otherwise unfair reasons. Indeed, the origins of the Mansfield rule derived
from a case where the jury came up with their verdict through a game of
chance. 25 Deciding a verdict through a game of chance is silliness and presents
a result that presumably nobody would try to defend as “fair” in a generic sense.
But there is nothing to do about this under the no-impeachment rule. 26 In cases
prior to Peña-Rodriguez, the Supreme Court had refused to recognize a Sixth
Amendment right for criminal defendants to impeach a verdict based on clear
flaws, irregularities, and misconduct in the jury decision-making process
21. Id. at 871 (appendix listing of the cases); Kittle v. United States, 65 A.3d 1144, 1154–56
(D.C. 2013); State v. Brown, 62 A.3d 1099, 1110 (R.I. 2013); Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C.,
304 S.W.3d 81, 87–90 (Mo. 2010) (en banc); State v. Hidanovic, 747 N.W.2d 463, 472–74 (N.D.
2008); State v. Santiago, 715 A.2d 1, 14–22 (Conn. 1998); Fisher v. State, 690 A.2d 917, 919–21,
920 n.4 (Del. 1996); State v. Jackson, 912 P.2d 71, 80–81 (Haw. 1996); Powell v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
652 So.2d 354, 357–58 (Fla. 1995); State v. Hunter, 463 S.E.2d 314, 316 (S.C. 1995);
Commonwealth v. Laguer, 571 N.E.2d 371, 376 (Mass. 1991); Spencer v. State, 398 S.E.2d 179,
184–85 (Ga. 1990); People v. Rukaj, 506 N.Y.S.2d 677, 679–80 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986); After Hour
Welding, Inc. v. Laneil Mgmt. Co., 324 N.W.2d 686, 689–91 (Wisc. 1982); State v. Callender, 297
N.W.2d 744, 746 (Minn. 1980); Seattle v. Jackson, 425 P.2d 385, 389 (Wash. 1967); State v. Levitt,
176 A.2d 465, 467–68 (N.J. 1961).
22. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869.
23. Id. at 871 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
24. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149–50 (1968).
25. Vaise v. Delaval, 1 T.R. 11, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785).
26. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 268 (1915).
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because to do so would subject the jury system to a level of scrutiny it could
simply not withstand. 27 In Tanner v. United States, the Court denied a Sixth
Amendment exception for evidence that some jurors were under the influence
of drugs and alcohol during the trial. 28 In Warger v. Shauers, the Court denied a
Sixth Amendment exception for evidence that the jury foreperson had failed to
disclose a pro-defendant bias during voir dire. 29 In McDonald v. Pless, the Court
denied an exception where the jury allegedly improperly calculated a damages
award through compromise by averaging the numerical damages submitted by
each member. 30
Distinguishing all of these cases, the Peña-Rodriguez majority reasoned that
racial bias in the administration of criminal justice by juries is both wrong and
systemically worse than other types of improper decision-making committed by
juries in other cases. 31 Although the sorts of jury behavior in Tanner, Warger,
and McDonald were improper, they were anomalies and distinct from the sort of
pernicious threat to the equal administration of justice posed by racial
discrimination committed by jurors. 32 In the prior cases, the Court stressed that
sufficient safeguards existed to protect against improper jury conduct during
deliberations and precluded the need for constitutional exceptions. 33 For
example, voir dire permits the court and attorneys to examine venire members
for impartiality. 34 Jurors can report misconduct by other jurors to the court
before the verdict and judges can remedy the situation through additional
instructions or perhaps dismissal of a juror and appointment of an alternate
juror. 35 Evidence of jury misconduct from nonjuror sources can be used to
impeach the verdict even after the trial is over. 36 Even so, the Peña-Rodriguez
Court determined that these safeguards were not enough to avoid the creation of
the exception for racial bias. 37 Questions about racial attitudes or bias to venire
members during voir dire could fail to disclose such bias, exacerbate any
prejudice that does exist, and might in fact harm jury deliberations. 38 According
to the majority, an accusation of racial bias is more stigmatizing than other types
of alleged jury misconduct and so jurors would be less inclined to report the
alleged racial bias of other jurors during the deliberations. 39 In the words of the
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 874, 884 (Alito, J., dissenting).
483 U.S. 107, 122, 125–26 (1987).
135 S. Ct. 521, 529–30 (2014).
238 U.S. at 265, 269.
Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 865–68.
Id. at 868–69.
Id. at 866.
Id. 866, 868–69.
Id.
Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 866.
Id. at 868–69, 871.
Id. at 868–69.
Id.
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Court, “it is one thing to accuse a fellow juror of having a personal experience
that improperly influences her consideration of the case, as would have been
required in Warger. It is quite another to call her a bigot.” 40 At the end of the
day, the Peña-Rodriguez majority concluded that a constitutional exception for
post-verdict impeachment of criminal jury verdicts due to alleged racial bias by
juries is needed “to prevent a systemic loss of confidence in jury verdicts, a
confidence that is a central premise of the Sixth Amendment trial right.” 41
Justices Roberts, Alito, and Thomas, the dissenters in Peña-Rodriguez,
disagreed with the Court’s holding. 42 Justice Thomas looked to the common law
history and found there was no common law right to impeach a verdict with juror
testimony of juror misconduct at the time of the ratification of the Sixth
Amendment in 1791 or the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. 43
Consequently, there was no constitutional basis for creating the racial bias
exception. 44 Justice Alito argued that the political process is the appropriate
place to decide whether to adopt such an exception and noted that the federal
procedure and the overwhelming majority of state jurisdictions have a strong noimpeachment rule that does not provide for a racial bias exception. 45 He pointed
out the critical interests of finality and the promotion of freedom in juror
discussions and decision-making advanced by a strong no-impeachment rule. 46
He criticized the majority’s failure to adequately explain how the safeguards to
protect against juror misconduct in deliberations are less effective with respect
to racial bias than with respect to other forms of misconduct. 47 Moreover, he
contended the majority’s holding provides no way to make appropriate
distinctions between different types of juror misconduct or bias, some of which
would implicate a party’s Sixth Amendment right and some of which would
not. 48 According to Justice Alito, the majority’s bottom line is the Constitution
is less tolerant of racial bias than other forms of juror misconduct. 49 But he
contended that neither the text or history of the Sixth Amendment, nor the nature
of the right to an “impartial jury,” indicate that the protection provided by the
Sixth Amendment is dependent on the type of jury partiality or bias. 50

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869.
Id. at 871, 874 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 874.
Id.at 871–74.
Id. at 877–78, 881 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 877 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 879.
Id. at 883–84.
Id. at 882.
Id.
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B.

Extending Peña-Rodriguez to Civil Cases in Federal and State Courts

Batson v. Kentucky could guide courts in determining whether PeñaRodriguez should be extended to hold that there is a constitutional exception to
the no-impeachment rule for racial bias by jurors in civil cases. 51 In Batson, the
United States Supreme Court held in the context of a state criminal case that the
Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment is
violated when a prosecutor uses a peremptory challenge against a juror on the
basis of the venire member’s race. 52 Batson involved a black defendant and
black jurors who were struck because of their race. 53 In Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., the Court held that race-based peremptory challenges violate the
equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause in
civil cases. 54 In sum, Batson initially applied to criminal cases but was later
extended to civil cases in Edmonson, and is grounded on the idea that race-based
peremptory challenges violate the equal protection rights of the venire members
who are excluded from jury service, and uses third-party standing rules to allow
a defendant or civil litigant to raise the equal protection rights of an excluded
juror. 55
There are striking similarities between Batson and Peña-Rodriguez. Both
provide a narrow exception to a broad right. Both initially applied in the criminal
context. Both initially applied to race. Therefore, Batson and its progeny is a
potential model for the development of the Peña-Rodriguez constitutional
exception and the extension of it to civil cases.
From a big-picture perspective, there is a similarity between Batson and
Peña-Rodriguez. There is a broad right for litigants to exercise peremptory
challenges on venire members for whatever reason the litigants want, except
Batson provides the narrow exception for race. 56 Juries can generally go back to
the jury deliberation room and come up with whatever decision they want, on
51. 476 U.S. 79, 104–05 (1986).
52. Id. at 89 (holding that while a prosecutor is generally entitled to exercise peremptory
challenges on whatever basis the prosecutor wants, the Equal Protection Clause forbids the
prosecutor from exercising peremptory challenges on the basis of race).
53. Id. at 82–83.
54. 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991).
55. For an application of third-party standing rules, see id. at 629, 631 (citing Powers v. Ohio,
499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991)).
56. A peremptory challenge is made to a venire member without assigning any reason. See
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965) (“The essential nature of the peremptory challenge is
that it is one exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the
court’s control.”); 9B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 2483 (3d ed. 2008) (“No reason need be given for the use of a peremptory
challenge.”). In federal civil cases, each party is entitled to three peremptory challenges. See FED.
R. CIV. P. 47(b) (“The court must allow the number of peremptory challenges provided by 28
U.S.C. § 1870.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (2012) (“In civil cases, each party shall be entitled to three
peremptory challenges.”); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986).
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whatever basis they want, and it cannot be constitutionally impeached after the
verdict is entered except under Peña-Rodriguez when the decision is based on
racial bias. 57
The similarity does not end there. The heart of both the Peña-Rodriguez and
Batson decisions is really an equal protection concern, although Peña-Rodriguez
is framed in the context of the Sixth Amendment 58 and Batson is framed more
in the context of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment than the
Sixth Amendment. 59 Race discrimination in the context of the administration of
justice in the court system harms the community as a whole and undermines
public confidence in the justice system in a systemic way, which is different
from other forms of jury misconduct during deliberations. 60 According to both
decisions, the resulting systemic and public harm is what makes race
discrimination so pernicious and worthy of differential treatment from otherwise
categorically broad rules—litigants strike venire members for whatever reason
and juries make decisions on whatever basis deemed appropriate even if the
reasons do not seem justifiable—that do not generally receive other
exceptions. 61 Compare language from Batson with language from the PeñaRodriguez majority and Peña-Rodriguez dissent.
From Batson:
The harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that inflicted
on the defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire community. Selection
procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from juries undermine
public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice. Discrimination within
the judicial system is most pernicious because it is a stimulant to that race
prejudice which is an impediment to securing to black citizens that equal justice
which the law aims to secure to all others. 62

From the Peña-Rodriguez majority:
All forms of improper bias pose challenges to the trial process. But there is a
sound basis to treat racial bias with added precaution. A constitutional rule that
racial bias in the justice system must be addressed—including, in some

57. See Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521, 529 (2014); Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107,
125 (1987); McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 265–67 (1915).
58. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017) (“[W]here a juror makes a clear
statement that indicates he or she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal
defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires that the no-impeachment rule give way in order to permit
the trial court to consider the evidence of the juror’s statement and any resulting denial of the jury
trial guarantee.”).
59. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 (noting that peremptory challenges are subject to commands of the
Equal Protection Clause and that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits peremptory challenges on
the basis of race in criminal cases).
60. Id. at 87.
61. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869; Batson, 476 U.S. at 87–89.
62. Batson, 476 U.S. at 87–88 (emphasis added).
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instances, after the verdict has been entered—is necessary to prevent a systemic
loss of confidence in jury verdicts, a confidence that is a central premise of the
Sixth Amendment trial right. 63

From the Peña-Rodriguez dissent:
The real thrust of the majority opinion is that the Constitution is less tolerant
of racial bias than other forms of juror misconduct, but it is hard to square this
argument with the nature of the Sixth Amendment right on which petitioner’s
argument and the Court’s holding are based. 64

1.

The Civil Case Originating in Federal District Court

With all of this in mind, civil cases in federal district court will start to arise
where, after a jury verdict is entered, the losing civil litigant will attempt to
secure affidavits from one of the jurors stating that, during jury deliberations,
another juror expressed racial bias. Under one of the applicable forms of the noimpeachment rule, the trial judge may be inclined to simply rule that the verdict
cannot be impeached through testimony about what occurred during
deliberations. But, after Batson and Peña-Rodriguez, attorneys now have an
opportunity to argue that a constitutional exception for jurors’ racial bias now
applies in the context of civil cases that the judge must follow.
There are two ways to look at this argument. First, the argument in favor of
rejecting a constitutional exception for racial bias by jurors in civil cases focuses
on limiting Peña-Rodriguez to the Sixth Amendment and highlighting the
distinction between criminal cases and civil cases. The Sixth Amendment
provides in relevant part that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . .” 65 A civil litigant
bringing a case in federal court and arguing for a constitutional racial bias
exception to the no-impeachment rule cannot rely on the Sixth Amendment
because the Sixth Amendment does not apply in civil cases. 66 The litigant will
have to rely on some other constitutional provision.
The civil litigant in federal court may initially hang his hat on the Seventh
Amendment for purposes of the jury trial right. The Seventh Amendment
guarantees the jury trial right to civil litigants in federal court where the cause
63. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869 (emphasis added).
64. Id. at 882 (Alito, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
65. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for
his defense.”).
66. Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 441 (2011) (“[T]he Sixth Amendment does not govern
civil cases.”).
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of action is based on a claim that existed at common law. However, there is no
specific language in the Seventh Amendment that guarantees a racial bias
exception to the no-impeachment rule. 67 Nor does the nature of the Seventh
Amendment compel this conclusion. One could say as a general matter that a
central premise of the Seventh Amendment is public confidence in civil jury
verdicts that are free from the taint of racial bias by jury decision-making, just
like the Peña-Rodriguez majority stated is the case in the context of the Sixth
Amendment. 68 But that idea seems more appropriately connected to a
generalized concept of racial bias in juror decision-making being more harmful
than other forms of juror misconduct in jury decision-making under equal
protection principles. The actual language of the Seventh Amendment focuses
on the civil jury trial right being tied to “suits at common law.” 69 This provides
even further justification for the type of historical argument made by Justice
Thomas in his Peña-Rodriguez dissent regarding the Sixth Amendment and the
common law no-impeachment rule. 70 At the time of the Seventh Amendment
ratification in the 1700s the common law did not allow a litigant to impeach a
verdict with jury testimony of jury misconduct. 71 This tying of the “common
law” language in the Seventh Amendment to the historical point made by Justice
Thomas regarding the actual common law rule at the time of ratification, makes
the argument for the racial bias constitutional exception in civil cases even less
persuasive from a textual and historical perspective than the exception for
criminal cases.
Litigants arguing against extending Peña-Rodriguez to civil cases could also
highlight fundamental distinctions between criminal cases and civil cases.
Criminal cases involve the defendant’s life and liberty. Civil cases typically
focus on money damages between parties. For this reason, different procedural
rules apply, such as the beyond a reasonable doubt burden of persuasion standard
in criminal cases and the preponderance of the evidence burden of persuasion
standard in civil cases. Refusing to extend the racial bias exception is just
another line to draw between criminal and civil cases. This is a familiar refrain:
criminal and civil cases are just different and therefore different rules apply.
Second, the argument for extending Peña-Rodriguez to civil cases brought
in federal district court should focus on equal protection principles, which apply
in both criminal and civil cases. Indeed, Justice Alito’s dissent forcefully
explains how the majority’s decision is less about the Sixth Amendment and
67. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall
be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the
common law.”).
68. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869.
69. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (emphasis added).
70. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 871–74 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 872.
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more about equal protection based on race. 72 Viewed in this way, the winning
argument for extending Peña-Rodriguez to civil cases brought in federal district
court is equal protection under the Fifth Amendment. This argument merely
takes a page right out of the Batson and Edmonson playbook.
A court considering extending Peña-Rodriguez to civil cases could easily
follow the extension of Batson to civil cases as illustrated by the Edmonson
decision. In Edmonson, the civil plaintiff claimed racial discrimination in a
peremptory challenge by the opposing party. 73 The civil case was brought in
federal district court and so the Seventh Amendment jury trial right attached.74
The Edmonson Court held that race-based peremptory challenges violate the
equal protection rights of the challenged jurors in civil cases just like the Batson
Court said they do in criminal cases. 75 Because the case was in federal court and
concerned the federal government, the Court based its holding on the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 76 instead
of the Fourteenth Amendment, as in Batson. 77 If Peña-Rodriguez is really more
about equal protection based on race than the Sixth Amendment, 78 it would
make sense when the juror racial bias issue in a civil case arises to simply follow
the logic of Edmonson and create the constitutional exception to the noimpeachment rule for juror bias in civil cases under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fifth Amendment.
Peña-Rodriguez is perhaps even easier to extend to civil cases than Batson
was because Batson’s peremptory challenge issue had the complicated question
of whether peremptory challenges by private litigants concern state action. The
Edmonson Court ruled that a private litigant’s use of peremptory challenges
constituted state action and was therefore subject to equal protection. 79 The juror
racial bias situation is more straightforward from a state action perspective than
peremptory challenges. The actor in the alleged jury racial bias is the jury and
not a private litigant. The alleged equal protection deprivation flows from the
jury. The jury is a quintessential government body. 80 The jury’s authority
derives from the power of the court and ultimately from the government that

72. Id. at 878–84 (Alito, J., dissenting).
73. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616–17 (1991).
74. Id. at 616.
75. Id. at 616–18.
76. Id.
77. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 879 (1986).
78. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 878–84 (2017) (Alito, J., dissenting).
79. State action occurred in Edmonson because the peremptory challenge right has its source
in state authority, the peremptory challenge system could not exist absent governmental oversight
and authority, and the selection of jurors is a governmental function even if in the peremptory
challenges context the government delegates a portion of that authority to private litigants.
Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 619–28.
80. Id. at 624.
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confers jurisdiction on the court. 81 In short, viewing juries as state actors seems
even less of a stretch than viewing a private litigant as a state actor. Furthermore,
Batson and Edmonson had to consider the standing issue of parties to the case
raising the equal protection rights of jurors. 82 The standing issue is not
implicated in a Peña-Rodriguez situation. If there is an equal protection violation
in the racial bias by juror scenario, the violation is against the litigant and the
litigant is raising the violation to protect his or her own rights and has standing.
The Supreme Court has gone to great lengths to focus on the unique nature
of racial bias and the importance of constitutional requirements to try and root
out racial bias in the criminal justice system through the Batson and PeñaRodriguez exceptions. 83 Is there any less of a policy reason for taking the same
approach in civil juries than is now done in criminal cases? What would the
principled argument be for making a distinction beyond a generalized idea that
criminal trials and civil trials have some differences? Jury decisions free from
racial bias are wanted in civil cases just like they are in criminal cases; this
underlying interest applies in both systems. 84 The systemic and public
confidence statements from both the Peña-Rodriguez and Batson Courts fit just
as well with the administration of justice by civil juries as they do with the
administration of justice by criminal juries. 85
The critical decision involving the creation of a constitutional exception to
the no-impeachment rule on the basis of racial bias by jurors during deliberations
is whether to actually open the door at all and create the exception in the first
place. The Supreme Court opened the door and created the exception. 86 But after
the door is cracked open to the exception on the criminal side it seems difficult
to justify keeping it shut on the civil side. It is only a matter of time for the
exception to become entrenched in civil cases brought in federal court.
2.

The Civil Case Originating in State Courts

Like the federal civil cases, civil cases in state trial courts will start to arise
where after a jury verdict is entered, the losing civil litigant will attempt to secure
81. Id. (“[The jury] is a quintessential governmental body, having no attributes of a private
actor. The jury exercises the power of the court and of the government that confers the court’s
jurisdiction.”).
82. Id. at 628–30. The Edmonson Court ruled in favor of the litigant’s standing to raise equal
protection rights of the excluded juror. Id.
83. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869; Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87–88 (1986).
84. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 630 (“Civil juries, no less than their criminal counterparts, must
follow the law and act as impartial factfinders. And, as we have observed, their verdicts, no less
than those of their criminal counterparts, become binding judgments of the court. Racial
discrimination has no place in the courtroom, whether the proceeding is civil or criminal. Congress
has so mandated by prohibiting various discriminatory acts in the context of both civil and criminal
trials. The Constitution demands nothing less.” (citation omitted)).
85. Id.; Batson, 476 U.S. at 87.
86. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869.
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affidavits from one of the jurors stating that during jury deliberations another
juror expressed racial bias. Under the applicable state law version of the noimpeachment rule, the trial judge may be inclined to simply rule that the verdict
cannot be impeached through testimony about what occurred during
deliberations. Like civil cases in the federal district court, attorneys now have an
opportunity to argue that a federal constitutional exception for racial bias by
jurors applies in the context of civil cases that the judge must follow.
If a state civil court considers Peña-Rodriguez as limited to the Sixth
Amendment, the state civil court will have no obligation to apply the exception
as a matter of federal constitutional law because the Sixth Amendment applies
only to criminal cases not to civil cases. 87 The Seventh Amendment jury trial
right only applies to civil cases in federal courts and not civil cases in state
courts. 88 So the Seventh Amendment is irrelevant to the juror racial bias
exception in state civil court. State jurisdictions have their own constitutional
provisions concerning the jury trial right. 89 Ultimately, a state supreme court
would be able to analyze whether the juror racial bias exception to the noimpeachment rule should apply to civil cases in their state in the context of their
own procedural rules, evidentiary rules, and constitutional provisions on the jury
trial right. But if the federal courts (and ultimately the United States Supreme
Court) hold that the exception is applicable in civil cases under equal protection,
then a state supreme court would presumably be constrained to apply the
exception to civil cases in their state courts. Such decisions would follow the
pattern of state appellate courts adopting the racial bias peremptory challenge
exception to civil cases in state courts after the United States Supreme Court
decided Edmonson. 90 Once again, Batson and Edmonson are the models for the
87. Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 441 (2011) (“[T]he Sixth Amendment does not govern
civil cases.”).
88. See Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 80 (1989) (White, J., dissenting);
Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217 (1916) (“Seventh Amendment
applies only to proceedings in courts of the United States and does not in any manner whatever
govern or regulate trials by jury in state courts or the standards which must be applied concerning
the same.”).
89. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16 (“Trial by jury is an inviolate right and shall be secured to all, but
in a civil cause three-fourths of the jury may render a verdict.”); ME. CONST. art. I, § 20 (“In all
civil suits, and in all controversies concerning property, the parties shall have a right to a trial by
jury, except in cases where it has heretofore been otherwise practiced . . . .”); N.C. CONST. art. I, §
25 (“In all controversies at law respecting property, the ancient mode of trial by jury is one of the
best securities of the rights of people, and shall remain sacred and inviolable.”); N.M. CONST. art.
II, § 12 (“The right of trial by jury as it has heretofore existed shall be secured to all and remain
inviolate.”); OHIO CONST. art. I, § 5 (“The right of trial by jury be inviolate, except that, in civil
cases, laws may be passed to authorize the rendering of a verdict by the concurrence of not less
than three-fourths of the jury.”).
90. See Bustos v. City of Clovis, 365 P.3d 67, 75 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015) (recognizing the
application of the Edmonson exception to civil cases in New Mexico state courts); Wingate TaylorMaid Transp., Inc. v. Baker, 840 S.W.2d 179, 182 (Ark. 1992) (recognizing that the Edmonson
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application of Peña-Rodriguez and the future line of civil cases applying the jury
racial bias exception.
IV. THE NEW BATSON: EXTENDING PEÑA-RODRIGUEZ TO OTHER FORMS OF
JUROR BIAS BEYOND RACE
Justice Alito provided a telling insight in his Peña-Rodriguez dissent. He
explains that if the Peña-Rodriguez decision is based on equal protection (as
opposed to the Sixth Amendment), expressions of juror bias based on suspect
classifications such as national origin, religion, sex, and First Amendment
freedoms of association and expression would merit equal treatment with cases
of racial bias by jurors. 91 And he goes on to further state that “convicting a
defendant on the basis of any irrational classification would violate the Equal
Protection clause.” 92 If this is correct and equal protection is really the driving
force underlying the Peña-Rodriguez decision, then Batson returns yet again as
a model for the development of Peña-Rodriguez law in both criminal and civil
cases. 93 The Peña-Rodriguez door is open to Batson-type arguments in terms of
broadening the characteristics of post-trial protection against juror bias during
deliberations to include sex, national origin, religion, disability, sexual
orientation, and age, among other possible characteristics. 94 The United States
Supreme Court extended Batson to ethnicity and gender. 95 Courts have
considered Batson protection for other “cognizable” groups or classifications. 96

exception applies to civil cases in Arkansas state courts); Washington v. Goodman, 830 S.W.2d
398, 400–02 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992) (recognizing that the Edmonson exception applies to civil cases
in Kentucky courts); Dedeaux v. J.I. Case Co., 611 So. 2d 880, 883 (Miss. 1992) (recognizing the
application of the Edmonson exception to civil cases in Mississippi state courts); Powers v.
Palacios, 813 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex. 1991) (recognizing the application of the Edmonson exception
to civil cases in Texas state courts).
91. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 883–84 (Alito, J., dissenting).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. (“Recasting this as an equal protection case would not provide a ground for limiting
the holding to cases involving racial bias. At a minimum, cases involving bias based on any suspect
classification—such as national origin or religion—would merit equal treatment. So, I think, would
bias based on sex, or the exercise of the First Amendment right to freedom of expression or
association. Indeed, convicting a defendant on the basis of any irrational classification would
violate the Equal Protection Clause.” (citations omitted)).
95. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 143 (1994) (gender); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S.
352, 355, 362 (1991) (ethnicity).
96. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769 (1995) (reasoning that long, unkept hair is not a
characteristic of race); United States v. Heron, 721 F.3d 896, 902 (7th Cir. 2013) (declining to
recognize a Batson challenge based on a juror’s religiosity); United States v. Iron Moccasin, 878
F.2d 226, 229 (8th Cir. 1989) (reasoning that Native Americans are a cognizable racial group);
United States v. Biaggi, 853 F.2d 89, 95–96 (2d Cir. 1988) (reasoning that Italian-Americans are a
cognizable racial group).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

412

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 62:397

Courts would likely consider granting Peña-Rodriguez protection to gender and
other suspect classifications in a similar way.
V. THE NEW BATSON: TRIAL PROCEDURES AFTER PEÑA-RODGRIUEZ
Trial procedures will change in three ways in light of Peña-Rodriguez. First,
jurisdictions will take steps to stress to jurors the importance of raising
allegations of racial bias to the judge before the jury is discharged. Second,
jurisdictions will develop frameworks for determining whether statements of
racial bias by jurors during deliberations influenced the verdict such that a new
trial is warranted. Third, jurisdictions will modify their procedures for postverdict contact with jurors.
A.

Model Jury Instructions

It is more efficient for courts to address allegations of racial bias by jurors
during the trial than after the trial is over. If an allegation of racial bias by jurors
is brought to the trial court’s attention during the jury deliberation process, the
trial court can remedy the bias by including supplemental jury instructions that
remind jurors of the duty not to discriminate because of race, dismissing the
biased jurors, and appointing alternate jurors. 97 The trial judge could then order
the jury to continue with their deliberations and not necessarily grant a new trial.
If an allegation of an expression of racial bias by jurors during deliberations is
raised by a juror after the trial is over and it influenced the verdict, the remedy
is a new trial. 98 Consequently, Peña-Rodriguez will incentivize jurisdictions to
incorporate model juror instructions whereby judges consistently remind jurors
that race must play no part in the jury’s decision-making process and encourage
jurors to report allegations of racial bias as soon as they arise and not wait to
report them until after the trial is over. 99 It seems plausible that such jury
instructions would increase the likelihood that jurors report expressions of racial

97. See State v. Tennors, 923 So. 2d 823, 833 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (“La. Code Crim.P. art. 789
permits replacement of a juror with an alternate juror when the juror is physically unable to serve,
or when the juror is found to have become disqualified, or to have either the real or potential for
bias in the deliberations.” (emphasis added)).
98. See Powell v. Allstate Insurance Co., 652 So. 2d 354, 358 (Fla. 1995) (deciding that a new
trial must be ordered if the trial court determines that racial statements were made by jurors during
jury deliberations).
99. Courts already frequently instruct juries that “bias” should play no part in the jury’s
decision-making process. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. Civ. 700 (“In reaching your verdict, do not let
bias, sympathy, prejudice, public opinion or any other sentiment for or against any party to
influence your decision.”); Walton v. City of Manchester, 666 A.2d 978, 980 (N.H. 1995) (noting
that the trial court instructed jury not to decide facts on the basis of any “sympathy, prejudice, bias,”
which was in line with standard New Hampshire civil jury instructions); State v. Moen, 786 P.2d
111, 137 (Or. 1990) (approving jury instruction cautioning the jury to disregard “bias or prejudice”
for or against the state, the victims, and defendant).
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bias by fellow jurors during deliberations before the jury signs its verdict. 100 The
instructions will also hopefully discourage jurors from making such statements
during deliberations.
B.

Procedures and Standard for Granting a New Trial Due to Racial Bias
During Jury Deliberations

The Peña-Rodriguez Court declined to decide what procedures a trial court
must follow when a defendant files a post-verdict motion for new trial based on
juror testimony of racial bias. 101 The Court also failed to decide the appropriate
standard for determining when racial bias is enough to grant a new trial. 102 But
these are certainly practical issues that all jurisdictions will have to deal with in
the near future.
The motion for new trial procedure alleging racial bias in jury decisionmaking should be tailored to each jurisdiction. But one approach would be to
initially require the motion for new trial to be supported by the affidavit of the
juror describing the alleged racial bias. The trial court could then evaluate the
affidavit to decide whether to hold an evidentiary hearing on the motion. 103 Live
testimony from the juror(s) alleging racial bias and other jurors who could
corroborate or dispute the allegation would be helpful—and perhaps even
required—because the trial court’s ruling on the motion would be affected by
credibility determinations of the witnesses. 104
The standard for granting a new trial could vary between two extremes: (1)
evidence of a racially biased statement in the jury deliberation room could result
in a new trial; 105 or (2) proof that racial bias played a motivating causal role in
100. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 870–71 (2017).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Kittle v. United States, 65 A.3d 1144, 1157 (D.C. 2013) (reasoning that the trial court did
not err or abuse discretion in declining to hold a hearing on racial bias allegation and admit juror
testimony because statements did not indicate racial bias affected the jury’s verdict); State v.
Brown, 62 A.3d 1099, 1110–11 (R.I. 2013) (upholding the trial court’s decision not to hold an
evidentiary hearing on racial bias allegation because evidence of racial bias was ambiguous); State
v. Jackson, 912 P.2d 71, 80 (Haw. 1996) (reasoning that the trial court has no duty to interrogate
the jury until the defendant makes a prima facie showing that improper comments were used against
the defendant).
104. Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81, 89 (Mo. 2010) (en banc) (discussing
that an evidentiary hearing should be required when a motion for a new trial alleges statements
reflecting racial bias were made by a juror during deliberations); State v. Santiago, 715 A.2d 1, 21
(Conn. 1998) (discussing that testimony should be sought from juror reporting alleged prejudicial
comments, jurors who could corroborate or dispute the allegations, and the juror alleged to have
made the prejudicial comments).
105. Fleshner, 304 S.W.3d at 89–90 (discussing that upon a finding by the trial court that
racially biased or prejudicial statements were made, the trial court should grant a new trial); United
States v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1121 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that racial bias or prejudice of a single
juror could result in a new trial).
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the verdict of the jury overall could be required. 106 It seems preferable for trial
courts to evaluate whether any expression of racial bias by a juror meaningfully
affected the jury’s verdict because there could be cases where the evidence
demonstrates that other jurors expressly rejected a fellow juror’s racially biased
comments and that race discrimination ended up playing no role in the jury’s
verdict. 107 Factors to consider in deciding whether to grant the motion for new
trial could include the statements themselves, the number of jurors exposed to
the statements, jurors’ responses to the statements, the strength of the admitted
evidence supporting the verdict, and any other matters which might have a
bearing on how the statements affected or influenced the jury. 108 Whether the
facts rise to the applicable standard will require a fact-specific analysis by a trial
court. Appellate courts would likely give considerable deference to the trial
courts that make this judgment call. 109
Batson-type frameworks for evaluating alleged racial comments and the
effect of the racial bias in the jury verdict are conceivable. In Batson, the focus
is on whether the challenged party made a peremptory challenge for race or
because of some other reason. 110 In Peña-Rodriguez, the focus is on whether the
jury based its verdict on race or for some other reason. 111 In Batson, the United
States Supreme Court developed a three-part burden-shifting framework to
ascertain whether a party’s peremptory challenge was really based on race or
some other reason. 112 Under this framework, the party alleging a race-based
peremptory challenge has to make a prima facie case of discrimination. 113 If this
happens, the burden of production shifts to the challenged party to introduce
evidence of a neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge. 114 If this burden
106. State v. Hidanovic, 747 N.W.2d 463, 470 (N.D. 2008) (finding that the district court must
decide under an objective standard whether there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict of a
hypothetical average juror would be affected by the racial comments); After Hour Welding, Inc. v.
Laneil Mgmt. Co., 324 N.W.2d 686, 691 (Wis. 1982) (finding that the trial judge is required to
determine whether statements were made and then evaluate their probable effect upon a
hypothetical average jury).
107. In Peña-Rodriguez, the Supreme Court indicated that judicial inquiry into the racial bias
is triggered when the racially biased statements “tend to show that racial animus was a significant
motivating factor in the juror’s vote to convict.” Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869
(2017).
108. Hidanovic, 747 N.W.2d at 470.
109. Santiago, 715 A.2d at 18 (discussing that the appellate court evaluates trial court’s decision
on jury misconduct under an abuse of discretion standard); State v. Jackson, 912 P.2d 71, 81 (Haw.
1996) (applying abuse of discretion standard to trial court’s decision to deny motion for new trial
based on allegations of racial bias during deliberations).
110. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S 79, 82 (1986).
111. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 861–62.
112. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767–68 (1995); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352,
358–59 (1991).
113. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 358.
114. Id. at 358–59.
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is satisfied, the challenging party must prove the stated legal reason is actually a
pretext for unlawful race discrimination. 115 Courts might apply a similar burdenshifting framework in the context of Peña-Rodriguez. For example, the party
that loses the verdict must make a prima facie case that a juror (or jurors) made
statements of racial bias. If the losing party makes such a prima facie showing,
the burden of production shifts to the winning party on the verdict to introduce
evidence that racial bias did not affect the jury’s verdict. If this burden is
satisfied, the losing party must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
the racial bias did have a probable effect upon the jury’s verdict. Alternatively,
once the losing party establishes a prima facie case of racial statements, the
winning party attempting to protect the verdict must prove by the required
standard of proof—preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing
evidence, or beyond a reasonable doubt—that the juror’s racial comments could
not have affected the verdict. 116 Because of the desire to protect the defendant
from an unfair trial, it seems probable that courts in criminal cases would tend
to place the burden of proof upon the prosecution to show that—once racial bias
by one juror has been established—racial bias did not affect the jury’s verdict. 117
C. Attorney Post-Verdict Contact with Jurors
After a jury is discharged, jurors in both criminal cases and civil cases have
always been free to talk to others about their jury service or to decline to do
so. 118 Attorneys who try a case are a category of individuals who have a special
interest in learning about the juror’s perspective of the case and the reasons for
their verdict. Attorneys may want to discuss the case with the jurors for
educational purposes to learn something that will help in the future. 119 But
attorneys on the losing side may also want to initiate post-verdict contact with
jurors to inquire about any potential misconduct from jurors to try and get a new
trial. 120 Federal rules, state professional rules of ethics, and local rules many
times place limitations on attorneys’ opportunity to contact jurors after the trial
115. Id. at 359, 363–64.
116. In State v. Jackson, the Hawaii Supreme Court articulated a similar approach. 912 P.2d
71, 80 (Haw. 1996). The defendant has the initial prima facie burden of showing that improper
racial comments made by jurors were used against him or her. A presumption of prejudice then
arises and the verdict is set aside unless the prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the
juror’s comments could not have affected the verdict. Id. at 80.
117. Id.
118. Fla. Std. Jury Instr. Crim. 4.2 (“Although you are at liberty to speak with anyone about
your deliberations, you are also at liberty to refuse to speak to anyone.”); TEX. R. CIV P. 226(a)
(“Thank you for your verdict. I have told you that the only time you may discuss the case is with
the other jurors in the jury room. I now release you from jury duty. Now you may discuss the case
with anyone. But you may also choose not to discuss the case; that is your right.”).
119. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline v. Benton, 980 S.W.2d 425, 433 (Tex. 1998).
120. Hall v. State, 253 P.3d 716, 718–19 (Idaho 2011) (criminal defendant filed motion for
post-verdict communications with jurors).
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is over. 121 Before Peña-Rodriguez, procuring a new trial based on juror
statements made during deliberations was generally not going to be a basis for a
new trial under the no-impeachment rule. 122 But now with the Peña-Rodriguez
exception, any limitations that prevent an attorney from initiating such a posttrial question to jurors in criminal cases are going to have to be evaluated and
perhaps modified in light of the Peña-Rodriguez decision. 123 For example,
stringent rules that prevent attorneys from speaking to jurors after the trial unless
permitted by the court in exceptional circumstances and under considerable
regulation may need to give way in the context of post-verdict contact that seeks
to inquire with jurors about possible racial bias during the deliberations. After
Peña-Rodriguez, criminal defense attorneys should presumably have some
opportunity post-verdict to ask jurors about whether any racially biased
statements were expressed during deliberations. 124
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court cracked open the door of the jury
deliberation room as a matter of Constitutional law in Peña-Rodriguez. Now that
the door is open a little bit, it is not going to be shut. The question is whether
courts are going to keep the door where it is or bust it wide open. There will be
pressures to keep the door where it is because of the practical problems
associated with increasing post-trial reconsiderations of jury verdicts. But equal
protection principles are going to push the other way because of the desire for
121. Cuevas v. United States, 317 F.3d 751, 753 (7th Cir. 2003) (explaining that rules regulating
parties’ post-trial contact with jurors are “quite common” and that most of the 94 federal district
courts have rules regarding post-trial juror contact); Dall v. Coffin, 970 F.2d 964, 972 (1st Cir.
1992) (“[T]his Circuit prohibits the post-verdict interview of jurors by counsel, litigants, or their
agents except under the supervision of the district court, and then only in such extraordinary
situations as are deemed appropriate. Permitting the unbridled interviewing of jurors could easily
lead to their harassment, to the exploitation of their thought processes, and to diminished confidence
in jury verdicts, as well as to unbalanced trial results depending unduly on the relative resources of
the parties.” (quoting United States v. Kepreos, 759 F.2d 961, 967 (1st Cir. 1985))); Haeberle v.
Tex. Int’l Airlines, 739 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1984) (“Federal courts have generally disfavored
post-verdict interviewing of jurors.”); MISS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.5 (2011) (“A lawyer
shall not . . . communicate with a juror or prospective juror after discharge of the jury if: (1) the
communication is prohibited by law or court order; or (2) the juror has made known to the lawyer
a desire not to communicate.”); Benjamin M. Lawsky, Limitations on Attorney Postverdict Contact
with Jurors: Protecting the Criminal Jury and Its Verdict at the Expense of the Defendant, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1950, 1980–51 (1994) (“Many of the federal district court local rules require a
threshold showing of good cause, or the explicit prior approval of the court before attorneys may
interview jurors. In many of the districts lacking such local rules, appellate courts have issued
similar guidelines. These restrictions burden access to an excellent source of potentially admissible
evidence of juror misconduct.” (citations omitted)).
122. See supra Part II.
123. See supra Part III.
124. See supra Parts II, III.
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fundamental fairness and justice in our jury system at a systemic level and the
need for public confidence in the jury system. Batson and its progeny will likely
play a significant role in making decisions about implementing and extending
Peña-Rodriguez.
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